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Abstract
A mathematical simulation model of Israeli defense spending since 1960 is 
developed its parameters estimated using data from official Isndi 
sources and its empirical fit evaluated via the dynamic trajectory fitting 
technique The three components modeled are the domestic defense budget U S 
military aid to Israel and Israeli defense purchases Over two-thirds ol tin. 
variance in each of these components is captured bv the model Israeli nnlini\ 
expenditures were found to be influenced by security concerns as reflected in 
the arms race with the Arabs and war involvement and by political and economic 
variables such as elections inflation and military aid
Major Characteristics of Israel s Military Budget 
Israel is frequently described as a nation in arms characterized b\ 
civilian control over its military as well as fragmented boundaries between its 
army and society (Luckham 1971 Ben Dor 1975 Horowitz 1977) Citizens ot 
Israel are often viewed as soldiers on eleven months leave and the countrx s 
military budget as the largest (per capita) m the world And indeed the 
Israeli military budget amounts to more than $5 billion per year (Heller 1984) 
or about $1400 per capita Israels defense budget presents a unique case in 
several respects
1
fFirst it is characterized by very high growth rates It is not unusual 
for total Israeli military expenditures to grow annually by more than 50% (in 
constant prices) Examples of such yearly increases occurred during 1956 1967 
and 1973 years also characterized by Israeli war involvement
The military budget also consumes a large portion of the country s overall 
budget In the mid-1980s defense items account for about 30% of the toni 
budget The ratio of military to total central government expenditure m Israel 
is reported to be the highest in the world (Arms Control and Disarmament Agencv 
1984)
Third the military budget has evolved in an environment of continuous 
conflict Israel has been constantly involved ir military conflicts in the 
Middle East In the four decades since its independence Israel engaged in si\ 
wars (the War of Independence in 1948 the Sinai campaign of 1956 the Six Da\ 
War of 1967 the War of Attrition m 1969-1970 the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and 
the Lebanese War in 1982-1985) and in numerous other military campaigns such as 
preventive strikes and reprisals against Arab terrorist bases Israel faces a 
permanent declared threat of physical destruction (Kimmerling 1983) and a 
se\ere quantitative military inferiority of approximately 1 5 in terms of
military personnel and about 1 1 6 in military expenditures - -  according to one 
estimate (Barkai 1980 23)
There is also a substantial gap between Israel s external defense needs and 
its financial ability to pay for them Consequently a large component of the 
Israeli military system almost one-fourth (Kochav 1983 50) is financed 
through a military aid program (grants and loans) which primarily comes from 
the United States Israel is currently the largest recipient of American
military aid
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Economically Israel operates under conditions of three-digit hyper 
inflation (about 400% in 1984) and its defense budget involves three different 
currencies Israeli shekels--for purchases and services in Israel U S dollars 
for military procurement in the US and a small sum of about $150 million 
tvpically devoted to weapon systems procurement m Western Europe (Hershko 
1985 p 4)
Israeli decision-making regarding the military budget is also responsive to 
so-called bottom up pressures Due to Israel s security needs and the 
perceived military threat Israeli decision makers (at least until recent years) 
have been sensitive to pressures by the military establishment to increase 
militarv spending (see Peri 1983 pp 213-215 Consequently the Israeli
military budget exerts an influence upon the size of the overall national budget 
and not vice i eisa as often characterizes so-called top-down svstems such as 
the United States These features of the Israeli military budget that
distinguish it from other nation-states make it important to identify the causal 
mechanisms that shape its evolution
To date studies of the Israeli military system have concentrated on such 
heterogeneous aspects as the Israeli army (Luttwak and Horowitz 1975) Israeli 
conventional and nuclear dilemmas (e g Aronson 1977 Horowitz 1982 Feldman
1982 Evron 1985) the Israeli military m politics (eg Ben Dor 197o 
Perlmutter 1969 Peri 1983) the military-industrial complex (Klieman 
1984 Mintz 1985b) the military and the economy (see Barkai 1980 Berglas
1983 McGuire 1982 and Zussman 1983) and the military and Israeli societv 
(eg Lissak 1984 Kimmerling 1983) Given the centrality and importance of 
the military budget in Israels political economic and social affairs it is 
important to seek an explanation of trends in Israeli military spending as well
rIn this article we present a model of Israel s military expenditures 
including domestic spending and arms imports from 1960 the earliest year for 
which complete data are available to 1984 This model seeks to incorporate 
those unique features of the Israeli case while at the same time permitting 
some generalizations to emerge The mathematical model is analyzed the 
parameters estimated empirically using data from official Israeli sources and 
the results are evaluated with an eye toward the future evolution of Israeli 
military spending patterns
The Model
The Israeli military budget is a complex document consisting of more than 
10 000 line items (see Hershko 1985 p 7) While the details of the Israeli 
military budget are secret and are presented for approval only before the 
important Foreign Policy and Securitv and Finance (Joint) Committee of the 
Israeli Parliament and to the Israeli government a series of in te rne ts  with 
top Israeli defense officials have enabled us to glean some important 
aspects of the process of defense budgeting and to elucidate major determinants 
of military spending in Israel (Mintz 1985a)
The point of departure in our current effort is the assumption that the 
Israeli military budget consists of two sets of expenditures domestic defense 
expenditures which normally account for more than 50% of the total budget and 
militar} imports the bulk of the remaining items The tormer is primarih 
earmarked for such budget items as compensation of employees in the defense 
sector purchases and services from the domestic economy and construction 
while the latter consists mainly of imports of weapon systems (see Mintz 1985a 
p 291 for a numerical breakdown)
The model of the evolution of Israeli military expenditures assumes that 
different mechanisms explain each set of expenditures Four major explanations
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for fluctuations in Israeli defense expenditures are intertwined in this model 
two are related to national security the other two are economic The mihtar\ 
explanations are the Mid-East wars and the Israeli reaction to Arab militar\ 
intensification while the economic factors are inflation and the amount ot 
military aid Israel is receiving The impact of the former two is basically to 
increase defense spending however high levels of inflation and the amount 
of military aid are thought to constrain military spending
The first part of our model addresses the first of these two major 
components domestic defense expenditures This component of military spending 
is represented in equations [1] and [2] m Table 1
The first of these equations portrays the budget requests as being driven 
b> three forces defense imports {Y^ } war involvement {Xj} and the percentage 
increase in Egvptian Syrian and Jordanian military expenditures {X2} Defense 
imports consisting mainly of procurement of new military equipment influence 
the domestic defense budget since the acquisition of new military equipment 
normally requires the expansion of maintenance and operations programs Thus 
defense imports tend to place an upward pressure on the domestic defense budget 
and do not we hypothesize involve tradeoffs of the kind McGuire (1982) has 
identified in Israeli resource allocation related to defense policy making 
During periods of war involvement m which a high number of Israeli casualties 
occur additional pressure is felt upon the defense needs since war involvement 
{X1} also invariably leads to replacement of military equipment that is 
destroyed or shown to be obsolete on the battlefield These pressures we 
propose will lead to increases in the budgetary request Finally no model of 
contemporary and historical defense spending in Israel would be complete without 
inclusion of some direct measure of the impact of the perceived threat that 
Israeli decision-makers face daily To the extent that the Arab states are
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increasing their military expenditures Israeli defense planners will feel 
compelled to request increases in the resources allocated to the domestic 
detense budget
Table 1 A Mathematical Model of Israeli Military Expenditures 
Domestic Defense Spending and Defense Imports. 1960-1984
Budget Requests
[1] Y { = ßj Y5 + ß2X! + ß3X2
Domestic Defense Expenditures
[2] dY2 = ß4(Yl - Y2) - ß5X3 + ß6X4 
dt
Israeli Military Aid Target
[3] Y3 = ß7X2 + ß8x 5 + ß9X[
[4] dX4 -  ß l0(Y3Si - Y4) 
dt
Defense Imports
[0] dY5 = ß[,(Y 4 - Y3)S, + ( 1 0 -  S1)(B12)((ß13\ 2  + ß !4X5) - Y5) 
dt
Total Military Expenditures {Identity}
[6] Y6 = Y2 + Y5
Variable Definitions
Yj = Requested Domestic Defense Budget
Y2 = Domestic Defense Expenditures
Y3 = Israeli Military Aid Target
Y4 = Military Aid from the United States
Y5 = Defense Imports
Y5 = Total Military Expenditures
Xj = War (Casualties)
X2 = Annual Percentage Change in Arab Military Expenditures 
X3 = Inflation
X4 = Election Year (1 = yes else = 0)
X5 = Israel Defense Forces Intensification Program (1 = yes else = 0)
Si = Military Aid Granted from United States U = ves, else = 0)
Thus Equation [1] portrays the hypothesized relationship between the 
military budget requests and three linear additive components defense 
imports war involvement and changes m Arab military expenditures
Equation [2] describes the actual evolution of Israeli expenditures The 
primary mechanism is an adaptive one that drives expenditures {Y2} toward the 
requests as defined in equation [1] (1 e {Yj}) The rate at which the actual
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and desired converge is captured m the adjustment coefficient 34 Due to the 
security threat to Israel and the strength of the Israeli military elite the 
level of defense expenditures approved is hypothesized to adapt to the requested 
level of military expenditures
The level of spending is adjusted upward in election years as it is typical 
for salaries of military personnel and defense related industries to be 
increased just before elections While the underlying dynamics may not undergo 
drastic change in election years during these years it is thought to be
especially difficult for the Israeli incumbent policy makers to say no to
demands for increased spending (Mmtz 1985c) Inflation as captured by the 
consumer price index {\^} is hypothesized to place some damping constraint on 
the growth of military expenditures in Israel For a treatment ot intlation in 
Israel see Bruno and Fischer (1984) for a discussion of the politics of
inflation in Israel see Radian (1983)
The second part of our model is represented in equations [3] through [0] in 
Table 1 It is interesting to note that this set of expenditures in the budget 
(1 e the ones earmarked for defense imports) is influenced shaped and 
constrained by quite a different set of variables most importantly the amount 
of military aid Israel receives (see Berglas 1983) Approximately 41% of 
Israeli arms imports in the 1973-1978 time period were financed through military 
grants while the rest were made possible through loans and other forms of aid 
(Kochav 1983 McGuire 1982) Equation [3] represents the establishment of a 
target for Israeli military aid It should be stressed that this equation
represents some consensus between the U S and Israel as to the need of the 
Israelis We posit that there is broad agreement upon 1) matching some portion 
of the changing military expenditures of the so-called confrontation states 
{^2) (EsyP1 Jordan and Syria) 2) the independent effect of war involvement
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{ \ \ )  on requested aid and 3) increased aid requirements during periods in
which a military intensification (X5} is underway
The Israeli military aid target as negotiated between the U S and
Israel responds to changes m Arab (Syrian Egyptian and Jordanian) military 
expenditures Israeli involvement m wars and major intensification
programs such as the shipment of M-60 tanks and F-4 F-15 and F-16
fighters Luttwak (1984 p 131) argues that these weapon system
intensification programs have reflected the force structure goals of the Israeli 
Defense Forces as derived from evolving operation concepts of war as well as 
changing definitions of national security This stands in contrast to man> 
third world nations that tend to define their defense needs in e \ post facto 
response to their weapons suppliers As in other countries however the
militan aid target in Israel is virtually alwavs greater than the amount 
actually being granted Equation [4] portrays the evolution ot actual militan
aid as it adjusts to the agreed upon military aid target
Finally military imports (Equation [5]) are posited to adjust to the 
amount of military aid granted by the U S In earlier periods in which there
was no military aid being granted by the U S military imports adjusted to the
percent changes in Arab military intensification programs as reflected in their 
defense spending and to IDF intensification programs Accordingly different 
mechanisms are posited for pre-1967 and post-1967 military imports
Finally an identit\ is used to represent total Israeli defense
expenditures which are equal to domestic expenditures plus defense imports 
This identity is represented as Equation [6] in the mathematical model 
presented m Table 1
To estimate the model we used data taken from official Israeli government 
statistics (see Appendix I for data sources and Appendix II for operational
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definitions and the actual data) The data on domestic defense expenditures 
defense imports and total military expenditures were obtained from the Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics (see Berglas 1983 for a detailed discussion of this 
data set) while data on military aid to Israel were taken from the Bank ot 
Israels Annual Report
Results
Our epistemology has been an orthodox one we developed a theory about 
the forces driving military spending m Israel derived from it an operational 
model specified from that dynamic model the variables of concern and collected 
data on those variables Subsequentlv we have been involved in both testino 
the model and in estimating empirical parameters for it
The testing of the model only in part resides in our implementation of an 
operating computer simulation (written m the DAREP language for difference and 
differential equation systems) The computer simulation which represents these 
ideas produces results which are plausible at least to us Part of the 
testing of our model also involves a more conventional notion of testing in the 
social sciences namely empirical estimation Using the methodology described 
in Ward (1984 appendix 2 therein) known as dynamic trajectory fitting we have 
empirically estimated the parameters of the system to help us determine whether 
the postdictions of the model permit us to accurately map the major components 
of Israeli military expenditures as they have evolved during the last two and 
one-half decades
The model is a system of three primary equations which implies that 
empirical estimation should proceed by simultaneously estimating the parameters 
of the entire system rather than proceeding equation-by-equation Table 2 
presents the results of these statistical estimations The overall fit ot the 
system to the empirical data is strong in that the overall systemic variance in
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the three dependent variables domestic defense expenditures U S military aid 
to Israel and Israeli defense imports is well captured In fact over 95% ot 
the total variance is explained in a statistical sense Individually each 
equation accounts for at least two-thirds of the variance in the empirical data 
All estimated parameters are significant m a statistical sense each of
the parameters is at least one order of magnitude larger than the error
associated with it Most although not all are m the predicted direction
Based on the empirical findings the process shaping the evolution of
Israeli militarv expenditures can be characterized as follows Growth in Arab 
military expenditures stimulates the two major components of the Israeli 
militarv budget It increases expenses for domestic defense production and
military manpower the so-called domestic defense budget It also creates the 
need to purchase military weapons s\ stems from abroad Since most such systems 
can not at present be produced domestically Israeli decision makers are 
forced to turn abroad This creates the need for increased military aid from 
the U S that determines the total amount of defense imports These militan 
imports feedback to expand of the domestic defense budget because of the need to 
support and maintain the newly acquired weapons systems and materiel The 
domestic defense budget is also influenced by the involvement in wars In 
periods of high inflation or elections it is adjusted upward
The findings also provide some insights into the behavior of the 
manv bureaucracies involved in the defense sphere the Israeli government which 
authorizes the spending the U S government that provides the aid and the 
Israeli mimstrv of Defense that imports the arms For example actual 
militarv spending levels adjust to the requested levels the military aid target 
is adjusted to the perceived military needs and the amount of militar\ 
imports rapidly adjusts to the amount of aid granted
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The next sections provide a brief discussion of the findings by examining 
each component in turn
Table Z  Estimated Coefficients of Israeli Military Expenditures
Dependent
Variable Right Hand Side Coefficients
Estimated
Value
Parabolic
Error
Domestic ßi impact of defense imports 2 4146 ± 10968
Defense ß2 impact of war casualties 32 580 ± 94094
Expenditures ß3 impact of Arab expenditures 491800 ±2349
R2= 957 ß4 adjustment speed 00071 ± 00000266
ß5 impact of inflation -0133 ± 000287
ß6 impact of elections 288 36 ±4 76
Military ß7 impact of Arab expenditures 454460 ±1133 1
Aid
R2=8I3*
ß8 impact of IDF intensification -31721 ±1729
ß9 impact of war casualties -21 93 ± 62934
ß 10 adjustment speed 00173 ± 00000304}
Defense ß ll post-1967 adjustment speed 1 5788 ± 04206
Imports 
R2= 692
ßl2 pre-1967 adjustment speed 000223 ± 0000041}
ßl3 pre-1967 Arab expenditures 278O500 ±46959
ß 14 pre-1967 IDF intensification -219740 ±17371
System descriptor R^s>s = 98}
Note that actual data are given m Appendix II
Excluding the pre-1967 period in which no aid was given the simple correlinoli 
between actual and predicted military aid is 60
Domestic Defense Expenditures
Figure 1 illustrates the visual correspondence between actual Isi ich 
domestic defense expenditures and those produced by our empirical estimates 
which are presented m Table 2 The fit in traditional terms is strong ind 
the corrected coefficient of determination is 957
The results for the domestic Israeli defense expenditures suggest that with 
defense imports at high levels domestic defense expenditures tend to be 
increased m Israel consonant with our hypothesis Moreover increases in 
Arab military expenditures are a strong positive force driving up Isiacli 
domestic defense expenditures Periods of intense fighting with then
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corresponding high levels of casualties also lead to increases in domestic 
spending
The adjustment of actual to requested levels {34} is significant vet
small suggesting that other factors also influence the domestic expenditures 
beyond what is characterized as the requested budget Two of those
influences are the level ot consumer prices (an indicator of inflation) and
whether there is an election High levels of inflation tend to accelerate 
not dampen the Israeli expenditures on the domestic budget--even in
constant prices When there is an election period increased demands may be 
placed on the decision-making bodies and our results suggest that these demands 
are met election periods do tend to be associated with increised expenditures
Figure 1 Estimated and Actual Domestic Defense Expenditures
Military Aid
Military aid from the U S to Israel is portrayed by equations [3] and [4] 
Figure 2 portrays the visual fit of the estimated military aid as compared with 
the actual aid both given in constant 1975 Israeli Shekels (converted from 
dollar figures) The visual fit is strong though falls far short of the
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convergence between estimated and actual found in the case of domestic defense 
expenditures The adjusted is 813 however indicating that about 80 
percent of the variance m actual military aid to Israel from the U S is 
accounted for by equations [3] and [4] All estimated parameters are 
considerably larger than their associated parabolic error estimates indicating 
their statistical significance The graph shows exactly where the equations 
fall down in providing an adequate representation of the military aid process 
In particular the large discrepancy between actual and predicted aid during the 
Yom Kippur war of 1973 is evident in the graph Nor do they capture the real 
decline in US aid to Israel between 1970 and 1973
The driving forces in this equation are the strong positive reaction to the 
growth in Arab military expenditures {67} and the adjustment of actual aid to 
the targeted aid {ßjq) Beyond that the impacts of post-war intensification 
periods of the Israel Defense Forces {ßg} and of war involvement {09} were 
negative and opposite their hypothesized effects This presents a puzzle 
given what are widely accepted characterizations of the impact of 
intensification of defense programs and war upon requests for aid by Israel In 
seeking more information on this topic a t-test (t=3 27 p= 03) showed that 
the percentage change in aid is significantly higher during the years 
characterized by IDF intensification programs In contrast aid was not 
significantly higher during war periods It seems at least plausible that the 
increases in Arab military expenditures and Arab reciprocal war involvement 
with the Israelis were themselves significantly related to IDF intensification 
programs In such a case it might be that the impact of IDF programs and war 
involvement would be masked by the impact of increasing Arab military 
expenditures In fact the zero order correlation between war casualties and 
the percent change in Arab military expenditures is 70 Moreover while the
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number of war casualties incurred m 1973 were markedly higher than in 1982-83 
the aid level in the latter period was not substantially lower Further since 
1974 the conditions under which aid to Israel has been granted have improved 
from the Israeli perspective involving more grants than loans and permission to 
convert some aid to local currency These trends may help to explain our
results
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Figure 2. Estimated and Actual Military Aid from U S
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As portrayed in Figure 3 the visual fit of actual and estimated defense 
imports (both given in constant 1975 Israeli Shekels) is strong The corrected 
R2 is 692 and slightly over three-quarters of the variance in Israeli defense 
imports is captured by equation [5] This equation tracks well both during the 
p re-1967 period in which defense imports are strongly influenced by Arab 
military expenditures and during the post-1967 period in which defense imports 
are primarily a function of the amount of aid that Israel receives from the 
United States All parameters related to defense imports are far larger than 
their standard error yet the sign of the impact of IDF intensification programs
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in the p re -1967 period is opposite to our prediction perhaps because ot the 
simultaneous growth in Arab expenditures The post-1967 adjustment coefficient 
suggests by its size (1 57) the almost immediate adjustment of defense imports 
to the military aid received from the United States
Figure 3 l
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As a further check on the empirical fit of the model we compared the fit of 
the actual and simulated identity shown in Figure 4 As expected with such a 
high amount of variance explained in the total system the visual fit of these 
two data series is quite high revealing no major composition errors introduced 
b\ treating total defense spending as the sum of two components This provides 
some added confidence in the model insofar as we did not model the totals 
directly
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Figure 4 Simulated and Actual Total Defense Spending
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Conclusions
Despite the large number ot putatively unique characteristics ol the
Israeli militar\ budget the torces shaping the evolution ot nulitarv spending 
in Israel are those which characterize military growth in manv other nation­
states in many other historical epochs For example Israeli military 
expenditures are reacting strongly to changes in the military expenditures of 
their rivals (ì e the Arab states) This is consonant with the action-
reaction hypothesis many have used to explain arms races (see Richardson 1960) 
The domestic military budget is also influenced by Israeli involvement in wars 
similar to the way in which wars almost always drive up expenditures As in 
other nation-states military expenditures are influenced by the ability or 
mabilitv of the state to finance military programs from internal or external 
sources The problem of who pays for defense pervades not only Israeli 
military decision making but also is important m virtually every militarized 
or partially militarized society Furthermore while each of the organizations 
involved in the process is concerned with a different aspect of the decision
Million
1975
Israeli
Shekels
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process there appears to be a convergence ot interests leading to the same 
policy preference namely the need to constantly increase militar\ spending
Huntington (1957 p 2) explained that military policy making is otten 
derived from a "functional imperative stemming from the threats to the 
society s security and a social imperative arising from social forces 
ideologies and institutions dominant within the society The so-called 
functional imperative is reflected in the Israeli response to military 
intensifications of the Arab countries and to the acute and prolonged conflict 
in which Israel continues to be engaged The social imperative is reflected m 
the willingness of Israeli decision-makers to increase military spending despite 
deteriorating economic problems such as h>perinflation their efforts in 
creating institutional arrangements with the US government that make it 
possible to increase military imports vis-a-vis the perceived threat and the 
fluctuations in spending that result from the pressures generated b> the 
election process
Israeli military spending behavior can be viewed mainly in terms of the 
magnitude of the increases in the budget and in terms of the relative uniqueness 
of the way m which Israel has solved its military expenditure problems 
In terms of the magnitude for example Israeli military expenditures following 
the Sinai campaign grew m one year by more than 100% in constant prices In 
terms of the the solution Israel has obtained massive external financing for 
purchasing modern sophisticated defense items Given the centralitv of securit\ 
in the Israeli decision-making calculus and the perceived military threat 
Israeli decision-makers react strongl> to Arab intensification programs and war 
involvement The U S responds to Israeli requests with aid and the Israelis 
utilize this aid to import weapon systems These interactions help reinforce the 
vicious cycle of actions and reactions
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Appendix I Data Sources
Domestic defense expenditures arms imports & total defense expenditures
1960-1974 Central Bureau ot Statistics Monthls Bulletin o f Statistics 
(1982) Hebrew
1975-1984 Central Bureau ot Statistics Monthly Bulletin o f Statistics 
(1985) Hebrew
1960-1974
1975-1984
Military aid
Bank of Israel Annual Report no 48-49 p 20 Hebrew 
Hassid and Lasser (1983) p 37 Hebrew
1959-1984
Arms expenditures of Egypt Syria Jordan 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Wot Id 
Militärs Expenditures and Arms Transfers (annually)
War casualties
1967 1969-1970 1973 Zussman (1983) p 18 Hebrew 
1982-1984 Israel Information Center Israel Government Yearbook 
annuallv Hebrew
Israeli Defense Forces intensification programs
1960-1981
1982-1984
IDF m Its Might 1982 (Hebrew) 
Author s estimates
1960-1980
Gross domestic product deflator 
International Monetary Fund International Financial
1981-1984
Statistics Supplement on Puce Statistics No 2 (1981) 
International Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics Monthly
1960-1980
Consumer price index
International Monetary Fund International Financial
1981-1984
Statistics Supplement on Price Statistics No 2 (1981) 
International Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics March 1985
Exchange rate
1960-1984 International Monetary Fund International Financial 
Statistics Supplement on Exchange Rates No 9 (1985)
Election years
1960-1984 Central Bureau of Statistics Statistical Abstract o f I siael 
(annually) Hebrew
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Appendix II Data I960-1983
YEAR Y2 y4 y 5 Yl ^2 x 3 x 4 ^5 Si
1960 146 3 0 00 64 5 0 0 10 19 6 0 0 0
1961 168 1 0 00 103 4 0 0 09 20 9 1 0 0
1962 185 4 0 00 123 8 0 0 11 23 0 0 1 0
1963 218 6 0 00 146 8 0 0 08 24 4 0 0 0
1964 226 3 0 00 123 6 0 0 19 25 8 0 0 0
I960 238 6 0 00 144 9 0 0 08 27 7 1 1 0
1966 284 6 0 00 150 6 0 001 30 0 0 0 0
1967 427 8 63 30 335 3 810 0 23 30 5 0 0 1
1968 563 9 27 60 291 4 0 0 30 31 1 0 1 1
1969 668 2 114 86 387 3 68:> 0 18 31 9 1 1 1
1970 787 8 548 13 681 2 68s 0 l:> 33 9 0 1 1
1971 900 5 290 08 559 3 0 0 29 38 0 0 0 1
1972 867 2 279 38 501 7 0 0 00 42 8 0 0 1
1973 Ilio 3 232 04 1168 0 2680 0 74 51 4 1 0 1
1974 1323 5 1546 14 989 9 0 -0 27 71 7 0 1 1
197o 1293 0 189 00 1310 0 0 0 09 100 0 0 0 1
1976 1174 0 10d8 31 1074 0 0 -0 06 131 4 0 l 1
1977 1121 0 579 79 703 0 0 001 176 9 1 0 1
1978 1127 0 620 57 953 0 0 -0 28 266 4 0 0 1
1979 1147 0 492 44 655 0 0 0 23 474 9 0 0 I
1980 1181 0 436 12 824 0 0 -0 20 1097 1 0 0 1
1981 1209 *J 516 86 997 0 0 -0 01 2378 5 1 0 1
1982 1281 9 578 45 691 9 458 001 5241 9 0 0 1
1983 1370 4 653 30 457 4 89 0 07 12874 5 0 0 1
Y2 = domestic defense expenditures 1975 Israeli Shekels
Y4 = U S military aid to Israel 1975 Israeli Shekels converted from U S 
dollars using exchange rates and GDP deflator 
Y5 = Israeli defense imports 1975 Israeli Shekels excluding the 1979 airfield 
intensification programs m the Israeli Negev 
Yl = number of casualties during wars specifically Israeli casualties in wars 
and not in other military activities such as preemptive and 
retaliatory attacks against Arab terror
X2 = annual percent change m Egyptian Syrian Jordanian military expenditures 
original data m 1972 US dollars 
X3 = Consumer price index 1975 = 100 
X4 = Election >ear = 1
X5 = IDF intensification program = 1 excluding the Negev airfield
intensification
Sj = Years in which there was some Military Aid from US = 1
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